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Understanding which emerging infectious diseases 
are of international public health concern is vital. The 
International Health Regulations include a decision 
instrument to help countries determine which public health 
events are of international concern and require reporting 
to the World Health Organization (WHO) on the basis of 
seriousness, unusualness, international spread and trade, 
or need for travel restrictions. This study examined the 
validity of the International Health Regulations decision 
instrument in reporting emerging infectious disease to 
WHO by calculating its sensitivity, speciﬁ  city, and positive 
predictive value. It found a sensitivity of 95.6%, a speciﬁ  city 
of 38%, and a positive predictive value of 35.5%. These 
ﬁ  ndings are acceptable if the notiﬁ  cation volume to WHO 
remains low. Validity could be improved by setting more 
prescriptive criteria of seriousness and unusualness and 
training persons responsible for notiﬁ  cation. However, the 
criteria should be balanced with the need for the instrument 
to adapt to future unknown threats.
T
he great inﬂ  uenza pandemic of 1918 and the increase in 
HIV/AIDS are 2 striking examples of the devastation 
and profound effect on human societies caused by emerging 
infectious diseases (EIDs) (1). The Institute of Medicine 
deﬁ   nes EIDs as “new, re-emerging, or drug-resistant 
infections whose incidence in humans has increased or 
whose incidence threatens to increase in the near future” 
(2). EIDs are a global phenomenon, with hotspots from 
which EIDs are more likely to appear, concentrated in 
low-latitude developing countries (3). EIDs are probably 
underreported, particularly in areas which have hotspots 
and also weak surveillance systems (4). A study in 2008 by 
Jones et al. reported 335 EIDs during 1940–2004 (3).
The purpose of the 2005 International Health 
Regulations (IHR) is to “help the international community 
prevent and respond to acute public health risks that 
have the potential to cross borders and threaten people 
worldwide” (5). This purpose includes development of an 
international reporting system, under which member states 
have a duty to report to the World Health Organization 
(WHO) “all events which may constitute a public health 
emergency of international concern” (5). These events 
are not limited to communicable diseases and can include 
contaminated food, chemical contamination of products or 
the environment, release of radionuclear material, or other 
toxic release (6). Events are reported to WHO by designated 
national focal points (NFPs) in each member state. WHO 
has designed a decision instrument contained in Annex 2 
of the 2005 IHR (7) to assist with the notiﬁ  cation process 
on the basis of an algorithm comprising 4 main criteria: the 
event has a serious public health effect, the event is unusual 
or unexpected, there is a major risk for international spread, 
and there is a major risk for international travel or trade 
restrictions. At least 2 of the criteria must be satisﬁ  ed for 
an event to be notiﬁ  able.
An IHR expert committee suggested regular evaluations 
of the notiﬁ  cation process (8). However, the only published 
evaluation of the Annex 2 decision instrument is a reliability 
study that analyzed NFPs notiﬁ   cation concordance (9). 
This study also reported a sensitivity of 80% (on the basis 
of 5 events) and a speciﬁ  city of 50% (on the basis of 4 
events). Although the study reported a high reliability, the 
number of events was too low to adequately assess the 
sensitivity and speciﬁ  city of the decision instrument. A 
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2008 WHO technical report on Annex 2 (10) mentions a 
2006 workshop assessing the decision instrument validity 
and ﬁ  nding a sensitivity of 100% and a speciﬁ  city of 55% 
on the basis of 10 events. There were no details on the 
methods used and the study results were not published.
The aim of this study was to evaluate the predictive 
validity of the Annex 2 decision instrument. We focused 
on EIDs by applying screening test evaluation methods 
to the IHR Annex 2 decision instrument and estimated its 
sensitivity, speciﬁ  city, and positive predictive value (PPV).
Methods
The sensitivity, speciﬁ   city, and PPV of the Annex 
2 decision instrument were calculated by asking an 
investigator to decide whether each event in a series 
of historical EID events would have been reported to 
WHO by using the criteria of the instrument. A panel of 
3 internationally recognized EID and IHR experts, who 
were independent of the notifying investigator, was then 
asked whether each event was truly of international public 
health concern. The sensitivity, speciﬁ  city, and PPV of 
the decision instrument were then calculated by cross-
tabulating the outcome of the notiﬁ   cation process and 
the true outcome of each event (taken as the expert panel 
consensus decision) in a 2 × 2 table.
The EID events used were sampled systematically 
from the list of 335 EID events identiﬁ  ed by Jones et al. 
(3), starting from the most recent and going back until the 
required sample size was reached. The study required 160 
events to have CIs that did not exceed 10% on each side of 
the point estimate of sensitivity and speciﬁ  city if sensitivity 
was 90%, speciﬁ  city was 55%, and 40% of events were 
truly of international public health concern. These values 
were chosen on the basis of the best available information 
(9,10). The IHR Annex 2 decision instrument was used to 
decide whether each EID event fulﬁ  lled the notiﬁ  cation 
criteria. The decision was based on the information 
available in the references for each EID event provided in 
the original report by Jones et al. (3).
To emulate real-life conditions, the investigator used 
only information available at the time of event occurrence. 
Each criterion was answered by yes or no, and >2 positive 
answers classed the EID event as notiﬁ  able,  according 
to WHO guidance. To establish the true outcome for 
every EID event, each expert had to give an opinion on 
4 statements: the public health effect of the event was 
serious; the event was unusual or unexpected; the event 
spread internationally; and the event led to travel or trade 
restrictions. The 4 statements were derived from the IHR 
Annex 2 criteria, but were retrospective and ascertained the 
a posteriori outcome of each EID event. A Likert scale was 
used to score each statement with scores from 1 (strongly 
disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).
Experts based their decisions on their opinion and 
knowledge and on a supplied information sheet for each 
event. They were blinded to the notiﬁ  cation outcome of 
each EID event and assessed each event independently. 
The opinion on each statement of each event for each 
expert was converted to a numerical score from −2 to 
+2 (Table 1), which was then summed to give an overall 
value for each statement and 4 values per EID event. For 
each statement, an overall positive score was considered 
a consensus agreement with the statement, and an overall 
negative score was considered a consensus disagreement 
with the statement. A null score was considered a failure to 
agree on that criterion. Events with >2 agreed statements 
were considered to be of international public health 
concern. Events with <1 agreed statement and >1 disagreed 
statement were considered to be of no international public 
health concern. Events for which there was 1 agreed 
statement and for which no agreement could be reached on 
3 statements were not used in the study.
Statistical analysis was performed by using Stata 
version 11 (StataCorp LP, College Station, TX, USA). A 
description was made of the distribution of events according 
to WHO region, type of pathogen, and type of event. We 
calculated the notiﬁ   cation rate; the prevalence of EID 
events of international public health concern according to 
the expert panel; and the distribution of these events by type 
of pathogen, WHO region, and type of event. Sensitivity, 
speciﬁ  city, PPV, and CIs of the decision instrument were 
then calculated. Concordance and its association with 
type of event, type of pathogen, and WHO region were 
calculated by using logistic regression. Concordance for 
each of the 4 criteria was also calculated. An intraclass 
correlation coefﬁ  cient (11) was calculated for the combined 
score allocated by each expert (aggregated scores of all 4 
criteria for each event, which provided a measure of overall 
concern; possible score of 20) to each EID event.
The appropriateness of the consensus-building method 
was tested by translating the judgment of each expert panel 
member into a binary scoring system, in which for each 
criteria, a score of 4 or 5 would translate to “I agree” and 
a score of 1, 2, or 3 would translate to “I disagree.” This 
process enabled identiﬁ  cation of which EID events experts 
individually considered to be of public health concern. EID 
events with >2 criteria agreed with signifying international 
public health concern. Agreement levels between individual 
experts and the consensus were then calculated.
Results
Of 204 identiﬁ  ed EID events, 13 were not eligible 
because they did not ﬁ  t the deﬁ  nition of an EID or were 
duplicates. Sixteen events were discarded because of 
insufﬁ  cient information, leaving 175 (92%) of 191 eligible 
events to be analyzed. Their characteristics are summarized 
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in Table 2. A total of 124 (70.9%) of 175 events fulﬁ  lled 
>2 of the 4 decision instrument criteria according to the 
notifying investigator and should have been reported 
to WHO, according to the Annex 2 decision instrument. 
No EID event was withdrawn from the study because of 
failure of the expert panel to agree. Of the 175 EID events 
assessed by the expert panel, 46 (26.3%) were deemed to 
be of international public health concern. Characteristics of 
these 46 events are shown in Table 3.
Of 46 EID events of international public health concern, 
44 would have been reported by using the Annex 2 decision 
instrument (sensitivity 95.6%; 95% CI 89.8%–100%). Of 
the 129 EID events that were not of international public 
health concern, 80 would still have been reported by using 
the Annex 2 decision instrument (speciﬁ  city 38%, 95% CI 
29.6%–46.3%; PPV 35.8%; 95% CI 27.1%–43.9%).
The overall concordance rate between notiﬁ  cation 
decision and international public health concern was 
53.1% (95% CI 45.7%–60.5%). The concordance rates 
for the 4 criteria of seriousness, unusualness, international 
spread, and travel and trade restrictions were 49.7% (95% 
CI 42.3%–57.1%), 58.3% (95% CI 51.0%–65.6%), 81.1% 
(95% CI 75.3%–86.9%) and 96% (95% CI 93.1–98.9), 
respectively. There was no strong evidence that the type 
of pathogen, type of event, or WHO region was associated 
with concordance (Table 4).
The intraclass correlation coefﬁ  cient for assessing the 
agreement level for overall public health concern for each 
event, by using an aggregated score of 20, was 0.68 (95% 
CI 0.60–0.74). After simplifying the scores to obtain a 
judgment for each EID event for each expert, the agreement 
levels for each panel member compared with those of the 
consensus were 76.5%, 84.6%, and 85.7%, respectively.
Discussion
The IHR Annex 2 decision instrument has a high 
sensitivity (95.6%; 95% CI 89.8%–100%) but a low 
speciﬁ  city (38%; 95% CI 29.6%–46.3%). These ﬁ  gures 
are consistent with previous anecdotal evidence (9,10). 
In this situation, trading speciﬁ  city for high sensitivity is 
desirable because missing events of international public 
health concern would have serious consequences and 
would outweigh beneﬁ   ts of a lower volume of false-
positive results. A low speciﬁ  city is not a major concern as 
long as the volume of notiﬁ  cation is low (9), and currently 
there is “little evidence that Annex 2 is being frequently or 
routinely used by State Parties in the assessment of events“ 
(12). A low speciﬁ  city could become problematic if the 
volume of events reported through Annex 2 increased. The 
low speciﬁ  city would result in an increase in false-positives 
results and increased costs associated with the notiﬁ  cation 
process and determination of serious events.
The low speciﬁ  city is reﬂ  ected in a PPV of 35.8%. 
The calculated PPV could be underestimated for 2 main 
reasons. First, the prevalence of events identiﬁ  ed  as 
being of international public health concern might not 
reﬂ  ect the prevalence of events truly reported to WHO. 
Second, in the current study, all EID events selected 
were submitted to the decision instrument, regardless of 
personal judgment. In real life conditions, events least 
likely to be of international public health concern would 
have been excluded even before being submitted to the 
decision instrument, which would increase the prevalence 
of events of international public health concern in events 
submitted to the decision instrument and consequently 
the PPV.
The speciﬁ  city estimate was lower than that in 2 other 
evaluations (9,10) (38% vs. 50% and 55%, respectively). 
Although our estimate could be a more accurate reﬂ  ection of 
the instrument speciﬁ  city, it could also be an underestimate. 
Because instrument criteria are quite ﬂ  exible and subject to 
interpretation, it is possible to reach a decision to report an 
event in which the likelihood of it becoming of international 
public health concern is small. In addition, courtesy bias, in 
which the assessor believes that that erring on the side of 
caution is more acceptable than not reporting that an event, 
could have occurred.
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Table 1. Values allocated to each opinion for consensus building 
for emerging infectious diseases reported to WHO* 
Opinion Value  allocated 
Strongly disagree  2
Somewhat disagree  1
Neither agree nor disagree  0 
Somewhat agree  +1 
Strongly agree  +2 
*WHO, World Health Organization. 
Table 2. Characteristics of 175 emerging infectious disease 
events reported to WHO* 
Characteristic No.  (%) 
Type of pathogen   
 Bacterium  89  (50.9) 
 Virus  39  (22.3) 
 Rickettsia  12  (6.9) 
 Protozoan  20  (11.4) 
 Helminth  2  (1.1) 
 Fungus  12  (6.9) 
 Prion  1  (0.6) 
WHO region   
 AMRO  77  (44.0) 
 EURO  49  (28.0) 
 EMRO  7  (4.0) 
 SEARO  10  (5.7) 
 WPRO  24  (13.7) 
 AFRO  8  (4.6) 
Type of event   
  New pathogen  70 (40.0) 
  Increased incidence  44 (25.1) 
  Antimicrobial drug resistance  54 (30.9) 
  New clinical manifestation  7 (4.0) 
*WHO, World Health Organization; AMRO, Americas; EURO, Europe; 
EMRO, Eastern Mediterranean; SEARO, Southeast Asia; WPRO, Western 
Pacific; AFRO, Africa. RESEARCH
The current study strictly applied the criteria described 
in the Annex 2 guidance without using the context of 
the event or personal judgment. The decision instrument 
criteria are designed to take context and personal judgment 
into account to be adaptable to current and future unknown 
threats (13). Use of personal judgment rather than strictly 
applying the decision instrument criteria leads to a lower 
notiﬁ  cation rate (9). 
Two events of international public health concern 
were missed despite the high sensitivity of the instrument, 
which reﬂ  ected challenges of predicting evolution of an 
event as it occurs and potential for human error. Although a 
sensitivity of 100% would be difﬁ  cult to attain, maintaining 
the number of missed events at an absolute minimum should 
be a priority when the instrument is revised or evaluated.
Prediction of seriousness and unusualness of events 
were least accurate and showed concordance rates of 
49.7% and 58.3%, respectively. This ﬁ  nding reﬂ  ects the 
subjectivity and broad spectrum of the seriousness and 
unusualness criteria. Although these ﬁ  ndings might lead to 
overreporting, criteria ﬂ  exibility is also “a major strength that 
makes the IHR future-proof against new and unforeseeable 
threats” (9). The other 2 criteria of international spread and 
restriction to travel and trade have higher concordance rates 
of 81.1% and 96%, respectively. Should there be a need to 
increase the speciﬁ  city of the instrument, the focus should 
be on tightening the ﬁ  rst 2 criteria and one should be more 
speciﬁ  c about what makes an event serious or unusual. 
Training staff at NFPs could also increase the speciﬁ  city 
of the instrument (by perfecting their use of the decision 
instrument) and its PPV (by preﬁ  ltering which events to 
submit to the decision instrument). Staff of NFPs have been 
trained in the past by using online tools and workshops 
(10,14), and both approaches could be used.
Sensitivity and speciﬁ  city of the decision instrument 
did not depend on event type, pathogen type, or WHO 
region of occurrence because no strong evidence of an 
association between concordance and these factors was 
found. This ﬁ  nding suggests the Annex 2 decision tool 
is adequate for reporting antimicrobial drug resistance, 
although it was not designed with drug resistance in mind. 
There have been calls to use the decision instrument for 
antimicrobial drug resistance events (15).
Although EID events were systematically, rather than 
randomly, sampled from the EID list compiled by Jones 
et al. (3), the distribution of events by type of pathogen 
was not signiﬁ   cantly different from the distribution of 
events in the complete list from which the study sample is 
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Table 3. Characteristics of 46 emerging infectious disease events 
of international public health concern reported to WHO* 
Characteristic No.  (%) 
Type of pathogen   
 Bacterium  21  (45.6) 
 Virus  18  (39.1) 
 Rickettsia  2  (4.3) 
 Protozoan  3  (6.5) 
 Other†  2  (4.3) 
WHO region   
 AMRO  17  (37.0) 
 EURO  12  (26.1) 
 EMRO  3  (6.5) 
 SEARO  2  (4.3) 
 WPRO  7(15.2) 
 AFRO  5  (10.9) 
Type of event   
  New pathogen  19 (41.3) 
  Increased incidence  18 (39.1) 
  Antimicrobial drug resistance  8 (17.4) 
  New clinical manifestation  1 (2.2) 
*WHO, World Health Organization; AMRO, Americas; EURO, Europe; 
EMRO, Eastern Mediterranean; SEARO, Southeast Asia; WPRO, Western 
Pacific; AFRO, Africa. 
†Helminth, prion, or fungus. 
Table 4. Association between concordance and pathogen type, by WHO region and event type* 
Characteristic  No. events  No. (%) concordant events   Crude OR (95% CI)  p value† 
Type of pathogen         
 Bacterium  89  27  (69.2)  1   
 Virus  39  46(51.7)  2.10  (0.95–4.67)  0.07 
  Rickettsia  12  6 (50.0)  0.93 (0.28–3.12)  0.91 
  Protozoan  20  7 (35.0)  0.50 (0.18–1.38)  0.18 
  Other‡  15  7 (46.7)  0.82 (0.27–2.45)  0.72 
WHO region         
 AMRO  77  40  (51.9)  1   
  EURO  49  23 (46.9)  0.82 (0.40–1.68)  0.58 
  EMRO  7  4 (57.14)  1.23 (0.26–5.88)  0.79 
  SEARO  10  5 (50.0)  0.92 (0.25–3.45)  0.91 
  WPRO  24  15 (62.0)  1.54 (0.60–3.94)  0.37 
  AFRO  8  6 (75.0)  2.78 (0.53–14.6)  0.23 
Type of event         
  New pathogen  70  31 (44.3)  1   
  Increased incidence  44  27 (61.4)  2.00 (0.93–4.31)  0.08 
  Antimicrobial drug resistance  54  32 (59.3)  1.83 (0.89–3.75)  0.10 
  New clinical manifestation  7  3 (42.9)  0.94 (0.20–4.53)  0.94 
*WHO, World Health Organization; OR, odds ratio;  AMRO, Americas; EURO, Europe; EMRO, Eastern Mediterranean; SEARO, Southeast Asia; WPRO, 
Western Pacific; AFRO, Africa. 
†By Wald test. 
‡Helminth, prion, or fungus. Reporting Emerging Infectious Diseases
extracted. The study sample and database from which it is 
extracted have a proportion of bacteria that is higher than 
other estimates of EID distribution (16,17). This ﬁ  nding 
can be explained by the fact that a large (43.8%) proportion 
of bacterial events are antimicrobial drug resistance events, 
which were not included as EIDs in many other studies. 
Jones et al. also reported  a bias toward events occurring in 
industrialized countries, which reﬂ  ect publication bias and 
better surveillance systems in these countries (3). However, 
these ﬁ  ndings do not affect the internal validity of the study, 
and the fact that the current sample includes a wide variety 
of types of events can give conﬁ  dence that the types of EID 
events truly reported to WHO are likely represented in the 
study sample.
The 16 events for which no information could be 
obtained did not statistically differ from the rest of the 
events, and the proportion of events without information 
was relatively low (8%), which made bias caused 
by information availability unlikely. The notifying 
investigator could not be blinded to EID events he or she 
was assessing, and it was possible to identify famous EID 
(such as emergence of Nipah virus) from the information, 
potentially introducing a bias toward reporting famous 
events. However, knowledge of these events is often the 
result of international concern, and they would have been 
reported regardless of these factors.
The intraclass correlation coefﬁ  cient of 0.68 showed 
moderate-to-strong levels of agreement between expert 
panel members. The overall score given by each judge for 
each event was believed to be a good overall reﬂ  ection of 
the role of the event. One limitation of this method was that 
the same score could be obtained with different opinions: 
e.g., if 1 expert strongly agreed that an event was serious 
but strongly disagreed that an event spread internationally, 
it would produce the same score as another expert strongly 
disagreeing with seriousness but strongly agreeing with 
international spread. However, when agreement levels 
were assessed for each criterion by calculating 4 intraclass 
correlation coefﬁ  cients, there was no strong disagreement 
on any of the criteria, making that scenario unlikely.
The method showed agreement levels between experts 
and the consensus >75%. This agreement could have been 
improved by using a Delphi style approach (18), showing 
panel members their results compared with the mean of the 
whole panel and having a second round of evaluation.
This study took the approach of treating the IHR 
decision instrument a as a screening tool, thus enabling 
screening evaluation methods to be applied. One strong 
point of this study was the sample size: 175 real life events, 
a large enough sample to accurately estimate sensitivity 
and speciﬁ  city with relatively narrow CIs. Furthermore, 
the fact that retrospective events were used enabled testing 
for predictive validity because in hindsight it was possible 
to evaluate the true international public health role of each 
event rather than just its potential for international public 
health concern. All panel members were internationally 
recognized as experts in the ﬁ  eld. Therefore, their opinions 
were as reliable as can be obtained by using such a method. 
The fact they were blinded to whether each event would 
be reported and to each other’s opinions, and the objective 
method used to decide on consensus for each EID event 
further strengthens the method. Increasing the size of the 
panel may also have added rigor to the evaluation.
The deﬁ   nition of an EID was wider and more 
encompassing than most deﬁ  nitions used in the literature, 
particularly because it included antimicrobial drug 
resistance. Therefore, the validity of the decision instrument 
was tested by using a wide variety of type of events likely 
to represent a range of events NFPs staff would encounter 
in real life.
This study attempted to replicate real-life situations by 
means of a theoretical exercise. The amount of information 
available on each event was limited, and the WHO Annex 
2 decision instrument criteria described in the guidance 
were rigidly applied. Furthermore, political or economic 
considerations that could not be replicated in a study 
are often taken in account when reporting an event (19). 
Therefore, the study implies a degree of simpliﬁ  cation of 
real-life conditions.
The sample of events was limited to EIDs in which the 
Annex 2 decision instrument is used for a variety of events, 
including radiation and chemical incidents and outbreaks 
of well-established pathogens. Whether the results of this 
study can be extrapolated to such events is not clear.
Although as much care as possible was taken to make 
the expert panel method objective, it still relied to some 
extent on individual opinion, and expert panel judgment 
on each event could not claim to be the deﬁ  nitive and 
universal truth. This shortcoming is inherent to the method 
and has been noted in other studies of the IHR Annex 2 
decision instrument that used expert panels (9,10). Every 
attempt was made to minimize subjectivity by giving clear 
written guidelines to each expert, blinding the experts to the 
notiﬁ  cation outcome, preventing experts from discussing 
the events, and deriving agreement mathematically.
The IHR Annex 2 decision instrument is a sensitive tool 
for reporting EIDs of international public health concern. 
The instrument lacks speciﬁ  city mainly because of broad, 
nonspeciﬁ  c criteria that can lead to overreporting. The PPV 
of the instrument is also relatively low. If one considers 
the nature of the instrument and potential consequences 
of WHO not being aware of an EID event of international 
public health concern, sensitivity should be prioritized over 
speciﬁ  city. In the current situation in which the volume 
of notiﬁ  cation remains low, the instrument is adequate. 
However, if the IHR Annex 2 decision instrument is to be 
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used more systematically in reporting of and the volume 
of notiﬁ  cation increases, there may be a need to increase 
the speciﬁ  city and PPV of the instrument. This increase 
could be achieved by focusing particularly on setting 
more prescriptive seriousness and unusualness criteria to 
be more speciﬁ  c about what constitutes a serious or an 
unusual event, and by regular training of NFP staff online 
and through workshops to ensure that NFP staff report only 
relevant events, which would improve speciﬁ  city without 
decreasing sensitivity and in turn increasing PPV. Also, 
focus should be placed on keeping the number of missed 
events to a minimum. However, instrument criteria must 
retain a certain level of interpretability so that the instrument 
can be adapted to a variety of unknown threats in the future, 
and not sacriﬁ   ce sensitivity, which should remain the 
priority of the instrument. Finally, the approach taken in 
treating the IHR decision instrument as a screening tool and 
evaluating it as such has proved useful in understanding its 
value and limitations.
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